Aldrich, Nelson Weight, & Esplin v. Industrial Commision of Utah, Department of Employment Security : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Aldrich, Nelson Weight, & Esplin v. Industrial
Commision of Utah, Department of Employment
Security : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Winston M. Faux; Utah Employment Security; Attorney for Appellee.
Jens P. Fugal; Gary H. Weight; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Aldrich v. Industrial Commision of Utah, Department of Employment, No. 920510 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4495
B H i t r 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKEJ^.p.U^ffli rmsi 
GARY H. WEIGHT ( 3 4 1 5 ) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALDRICH, NELSON WEIGHT, 
& ESPLIN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Department of Employment 
Security, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 92-A-0247 
Decision No. 92-BR-238 
Docket No. 920510-CA 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN DECISION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ENTERED JUNE 2, 1992, BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE KENNETH A. MAJOR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
JENS P. FUGAL (1135) 
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
JENS P. FUGAL (1135) 
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALDRICH, NELSON WEIGHT, : 
& ESPLIN, : 
: Case No. 92-A-0247 
Appellant, : Decision No. 92-BR-238 
: Docket No. 920510-CA 
vs. : 
: Priority No. 7 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : 
Department of Employment : 
Security, : 
Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN DECISION REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
ENTERED JUNE 2, 1992, BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE KENNETH A. MAJOR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JI 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
JENS P. FUGAL (1135) 
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellee Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES il 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
ARGUMENTS 4 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HEARING 
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE LASTED 
APPROXIMATELY FOUR (4) HOURS 4 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S 
FEE AND THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDED BY THE BOARD 
OF REVIEW IS UNREASONABLY LOW 5 
POINT III 
ABRAHAM KARBAKHSH, THE CLAIMANT BELOW WAS 
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF R562-18B-3.5 
POINT IV 
UNDER SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES THE LIMITATION 
APPLIED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WAS AN 
EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF A PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
ADDENDUM 15 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes 
Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 1 2, 12 
Constitution of Utah, Section 7 Article I 12 
Constitution of Utah, Section 11 Article I 2 
Utah Administrative Code, R562-18b-3.5 1,5,8 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5 (b) (1) 3 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5 (b) (2) 3 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4) (d) 2 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(g) 2 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2) 1 
Cases 
Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 965 
at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) 2 
Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
817 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1991) 2 
Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 207 P.2d 178 
(Ut. 1949) 5, 6 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALDRICH, NELSON WEIGHT, 
& ESPLIN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Department of Employment 
Security, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 92-A-0247 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in.this matter pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;... 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the Board of Review err in finding the hearing before 
the Administrative Law Judge lasted approximately four (4) hours 
rather than in excess of 15 hours as was shown by the evidence 
submitted by Appellant? 
2. Was the claimant below, Abraham Karbakhsh, denied "due 
process" within the meaning of R562-18b-3.S, which would preclude 
in some other way an opportunity for due process? 
3- Under Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, 
is that limitation of attorney's fees as applied in this case an 
effective denial of a remedy by due course of law? 
4. Is a limitation of attorney's fees effectively a denial of 
due process of law pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
The standard of review for each issue stated above is as 
follows: 
(A) In considering an appeal from a state agency, the 
standard of review is that an appellate court may grant relief if 
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact made or 
implied by the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the*, court (§63-46b-
16(4) (g), Utah Code Annotated). Substantial evidence is such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion. Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 
965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
(B) Issues 2, 3 and 4 above, constitutional questions are 
characterized as questions of law, and under sub-section (4)(d) of 
§63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, agency determinations of law, 
which include interpretations of the state and federal 
constitutions, and are to be reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision. Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1991). 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Appellant represented Abraham Karbakhsh in a hearing before 
Kenneth A. Major, Administrative Law Judge, to determine Mr. 
Karbakhshfs eligibility for unemployment benefits. Mr. Karbakhsh 
had been charged with theft by deception as a basis to deny 
benefits under §35-4-5(b)(2) of the Utah Code. However, the 
charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing and the case and 
the reasons for denial of benefits were considered under §35-4-
5(b)(1), Utah Code Annotated. 
Mr. Karbakhsh sought counsel to represent him in his claim for 
unemployment benefits and originally retained counsel in the Salt 
Lake City area. The Salt Lake City counsel progressed in the case 
to a point and then Mr. Karbakhsh approached Appellant and 
indicated that his Salt Lake counsel was too expensive and that he 
could not afford to go forward with pursuit of his unemployment 
compensation claim under the arrangements he had with his Salt Lake 
counsel. Mr. Karbakhsh solicited an employment agreement * with 
Appellant and was advised that Appellant would provide two (2) 
attorneys, one (1) of which had successfully represented him in the 
criminal charges and that the total fee would be Four Thousand 
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00). Mr. Karbakhsh accepted the 
employment agreement and paid Appellant Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Dollars ($4,300.00). 
In sharp contrasts to the usual hearing, this hearing was some 
15 hours of hearing time continued twice to hearing dates one week 
apart. The employer called seven (7) of its paid employees as 
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witnesses, and one (1) former employee and a third-party witness, 
in presenting its case. Following the hearing, Appellant submitted 
its claim for attorney's fees in the amount of Four Thousand Three 
Hundred Dollars ($4,3 00.00) which included the time of two (2) 
attorneys for most of the 15 hours of hearing time. The 
Administrative Law Judge limited fees to One Thousand Four Hundred 
Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50), 25 percent (25%) of 
claimant's maximum unemployment entitlement of Five Thousand Seven 
Hundred Forty-six Dollars ($5,746.00). Appellant sought an appeal 
to the Board of Review which affirmed the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision; however, the Board of Review erred in its 
statement finding that the attorneys attended only four (4) hours 
of hearing time. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HEARING BEFORE THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE LASTED APPROXIMATELY FOUR (4) HOURS. 
In its Decision dated July 27, 1992, the Board of Review 
erroneously found that the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge "lasted approximately four hours and the attorneys had 
several consultation sessions with the claimant." In the Petition 
for Approval of Fee submitted by Appellant, there is an itemized 
statement of legal services, including entries for three (3) 
separate hearings. The first hearing occurred on February 20, 
1992, and lasted 4.5 hours. The second hearing was held on 
February 27, 1992, and lasted 4.3 hours. The third hearing was 
held on March 6, 1992, and lasted 4.0 hours. The total time 
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involved in hearings alone was approximately 13 hours. The total 
time in hearings between Appellant's two (2) attorneys was 
approximately 2 3 hours. The Board of Review concluded that the 
hearing lasted less than one-third of the actual time. 
Correspondingly, the Board of Review allowed attorney's fees equal 
to approximately one-third of the amount agreed upon between Mr. 
Karbakhsh and Appellant. Arguably, the grant of a lower fee is 
consistent with the Board's finding that less time was involved 
than actually was involved. Thus, Appellant contends that the 
erroneous conclusion of the Board of Review that only four (4) 
hours were involved in hearing of this matter before the 
Administrative Law Judge, necessarily led to the Board's conclusion 
that a lower fee was justified. 
The matter should be reversed and/or remanded with directions 
to correct the findings consistent with the record in this case. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE AND THE 
ATTORNEYS FEE AWARDED BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS UNREASONABLY LOW 
At the hearings before the Administrative Law Judge, the 
employer, WordPerfect Corporation, hired two (2) attorneys to 
represent its interests and made available seven (7) employees and 
one (1) prior employee as witnesses in the case. Mr. Karbakhsh had 
the right to have equal access to counsel of his choosing to fairly 
and thoroughly represent his interests before the Administrative 
Law Judge. A case addressing these issues was decided by the 
Supreme Court in Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 207 P. 2d 178 
(Ut. 1949) . In Thatcher, the widow of Morris Dewayne Rosenbaum 
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filed a claim for compensation of her deceased husband upon the 
ground that when he was injured, he was employed by "Sholty." 
There was an issue of whether or not the deceased was employed by 
"Sholty" or "Seashore." The Commission decided that at the time of 
his injury, the deceased was employed by "Seashore" and therefore 
not covered by workman's compensation. Mrs. Rosenbaum then 
consulted with plaintiffs, Thatcher, who agreed to take her case 
and seek a reversal of the Commission's order denying the award. 
The plaintiffs also agreed to accept a reasonable fee to be 
determined if plaintiffs were successful. Plaintiffs eventually 
were successful and agreed upon a fee of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) with Mrs. Rosenbaum. On remittitur, the Commission 
vacated its previous order denying the award and entered an order 
awarding to the dependents of the decedent benefits in the sum of 
Seven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($7,250.00). The 
commission also fixed the fee of the plaintiffs for legal services 
at Three Hundred Seventy-five Dollars ($375.00). Plaintiffs 
thereupon filed with the Industrial Commission their Application 
for Rehearing on the ground that the sum of Three Hundred Seventy-
five Dollars ($375.00) was inadequate for the services performed 
and that One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) was a reasonable fee. 
The Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Coirmission and the 
matter was appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set 
aside the order of the Commission and remanded the case for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in the 
Opinion. 
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Among the views expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees are the following: 
While attorneys may not hope to be compensated to the 
full measure of their time and work, they must not be 
limited to such niggardly fees that they cannot afford to 
accept compensation cases. And particularly, where it 
has become necessary to carry a compensation case to this 
Court should the Commission be at least moderately 
liberal in the allowance of attorney's fees.... 
It thus transpires that while the attorney and client 
compensation cases may have freedom of contract to agree 
on a fee for services performed by the attorney before 
the Industrial Commission and before the Supreme Court, 
such contract is not binding on the Commission and no 
greater sum may be charged than that fixed by the 
Industrial Commission, if the fee so fixed by it is 
within the limits of reasonableness even though the 
parties have agreed on a larger sum.... 
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to 
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the 
acceptance of employment in the particular case will 
preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases 
likely to arise out of the transaction and in which there 
is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be 
employed, or would involve the loss of other employment 
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with 
other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for 
similar services; (4) the amount involved in the 
controversy and for the benefits resulting to the client 
from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of 
the compensation; and (6) the character of the 
employment, whether casual or for an established and 
constant client. No one of these considerations in 
itself is controlling. 
In this case, counsel spent a combined total time of 41.9 
hours from the time they were retained by Mr. Karbakhsh to and 
including the decision of the Department of Employment Security. 
Appellant has spent considerable additional time in pursuing its 
petition for approval of the fee and now in this appeal. Based on 
the number of hours spent by Appellant in representing Mr. 
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Karbakhsh before the Department of Employment Security and based 
upon an agreement reached between Mr. Karbakhsh and Appellant for 
compensation for legal services, Appellant contends that it is 
reasonable that it be awarded attorney's fees of Four Thousand 
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00), an amount consistent with hourly 
rates charged by attorneys practicing in the Utah County area, and 
consistent with the amount of Mr. Karbakhsh agreed to pay counsel. 
POINT III 
ABRAHAM KARBAKHSH, THE CLAIMANT BELOW WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW WITHIN THE MEANING OF R562-18B-3.5. 
The claimant in the proceeding below was effectively denied 
his rights to due process of law by the limitation on the 
attorney's fees as interpreted or dictated by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. The Utah Administrative Code provides at R562--
18b-3.5 as follows: 
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the 
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement 
unless such a limitation would preclude the claimant from 
pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court or would preclude 
in some other way an opportunity for due process. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
According to the administrative code, if the 25 percent (25%) 
limit would preclude an appeal or preclude in some other way an 
opportunity for due process, the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on the 
fees allowable to attorneys for the claimant may be avoided. In 
allowing for higher attorney's fees in the event an appeal was 
taken, the drafters of this provision recognizee that unusual 
circumstance justified the setting aside of the limitation on fees. 
Implicit in the notion of allowing higher fees ii the appeal is 
8 
that the number of hours of attorney time involved would be far 
more than in the usual case and that because of the extra time 
commitment for attorneys in a case, there would be a substantial 
dis-incentive to protect the rights of a claimant if there was no 
adequate compensation for the additional time required to prosecute 
the appeal. Similarly in this case, the amount of attorney time 
involved was far more than that involved in the usual case. In 
this case the hearing lasted at least 13 hours and was continued 
over a period of two (2) weeks. 
The Administrative Code provides that the due process of law 
may justify avoidance of the limit. Under the Constitution of the 
United States, the proceeding or hearing requisite to due process 
must be appropriate, fair, adequate, and such as is practicable and 
reasonable in the particular case. It must be an orderly 
proceeding, adapted to the nature of the case, in which the person 
to be affected has an opportunity to defend, enforce, and protect 
his rights. The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. Since the essential reason for the due process requirement 
of a hearing prior to deprivation of property is to prevent unfair 
and mistaken deprivations of property, such hearing must provide a 
real test. (See 16A Am Jur 2d 841 and cases cited thereunder.) 
Unusual circumstances exist in this case which justify 
departure from the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on attorney fees. In 
this case the claimant, Mr. Karbakhsh, was accused of taking a 
large number of used and some new floppy disk drives suitable for 
9 
use in personal computers from his employer under circumstances 
amounting to theft by deception or a fraudulent taking of property. 
The hearing was much more like a criminal trial than like the usual 
hearing for unemployment benefits. The employer called several 
witnesses to establish the alleged fraudulent statements made by 
the claimant and thereafter introduced documents and other 
witnesses to establish the falsity of the statements to prove the 
falsity of the statements made by Mr. Karbakhsh. The employers 
case alone, from the recollection of counsel for the claimant, 
involved eight (8) to ten (10) hours of hearing time before any 
witnesses were called on behalf of the claimant. 
In the Petition for Approval of Fees, Appellant submitted 41.9 
hours of actual time. Most of the time spent by counsel was 
involved in the actual 13 hours of hearing in which one or both of 
them were present. The Administrative Law Judge allowed One 
Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) in 
total fees. The hourly rate allowed is Thirty-four and 28/100 
Dollars ($34.28) per hour of attorney time. The fees allowed for 
the time expended fall far short of the modest amount requested and 
are totally insufficient to justify taking the case, in light of 
the usual overhead requirements involved in running a law office. 
Since the fees allowed here were so low, there was no possible way 
the firm could represent Mr. Karbakhsh on an appeal of the decision 
of the Administrative Law Judge. 
In this case, the proceeding was akin to that of a 
prosecutorial proceeding in which the wealthy employer as 
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prosecutor availed itself of many paid witnesses, and a staff of 
attorneys to martial the evidence, prepare witnesses, and present 
a well prepared case to the Administrative Law Judge. Mr. 
Karbakhsh on the other hand, with his relatively meager funds, 
attempted to defend his rights to unemployment compensation with 
skilled counsel hampered, as is usually the case, by his inability 
to interview witnesses then employed by WordPerfect Corporation as 
well as his lack of funds to be able to secure and interview 
witnesses in his favor who had left WordPerfect. Certainly this 
was not a fair hearing where so many exhibits and witnesses were 
called and the hearing lasted so long that there was no possible 
way for the counsel representing Mr. Karbakhsh to provide adequate 
and responsive representation of his interests, even at the modest 
level requested, let alone the One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six 
and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) allowed by the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel which 
is implicit in the concept of due process is eviscerated if there 
is no provision for fair compensation in a hearing in which the 
employer may dominate the hearing time through the calling of many 
paid witnesses while the claimant is denied justice because his 
meager resources essentially require that he find counsel willing 
to represent him at far less than the usual rate of compensation, 
let alone represent him on an appeal from the ruling of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
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POINT IV 
UNDER SECTION 7 OP ARTICLE I OP THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES THE 
LIMITATION APPLIED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WAS AN 
EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF A PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel in 
civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process. In an 
adversarial system of justice, representation by counsel is 
indispensable to effective protection of individual rights. 
Pursuant to Section 7 of Article I of the constitution of the State 
of Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In this case, the limitation upon the fees allowed 
by the Administrative Law Judge effectively prohibited Mr. 
Karbakhsh from obtaining a fair hearing. Fair hearings imply at 
least a relatively level playing field. In this case, the wealth 
of the employer was displayed in the evidence adduced at the 
hearing. There was no possible way for the claimant to compete. 
After the employer had presented its case in chief, practically all 
of the resources of the claimant were exhausted and there was so 
little left that there was no hope of obtaining assistance of 
counsel in the prosecution of an appeal of the decision. 
Fundamental to the adversarial system of justice is the concept of 
champions representing the causes of their clients. If one is 
given unlimited weapons while the other has "one hand tied behind 
his back," the fairness of the proceeding must be questioned. 
In this case, allowing the employer to use any and all 
resources available while limiting the claimant to fees at 25 
percent (25%) of the maximum unemployment entitlement of the 
12 
claimant, while perhaps understandable as a parental function of 
the government to protect claimants from their own improvident 
contracts, amounts to a denial of due process. If the contest is 
rigged so there is effectively no chance one of the combatants can 
prevail, there can be no fair trial or hearing within the concept 
of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review erred in finding that the hearing before the 
Administrative Law Judge lasted approximately four (4) hours. 
Appellant is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee and the 
attorney's fee awarded by the Board of Review is unreasonably low. 
Abraham karbakhsh, the claimant below was denied due process of law 
within the meaning of R562-18b-3.5. Under section 7 of Article I 
of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States the limitation applied by the 
Administrative Law Judge was an effective denial of a property 
without due process of law. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
decision of the Board of Review and to award Appellant attorney's 
fees of $4,300.00 or in the alternative to remand the case to the 
Board of Review with instructions to amend the attorney's fee award 
to be consistent with this Court's opinion. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 1992. 
.i?(h * 
*• i-w / / LJLUJC^~ 
'JENS 'P." FIK&L GARV^ &/ WEIGHT 
Attorney/for Appellant Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Winston M. Faux, 
Attorney for Appellee, at P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
this 21st day of December, 1992. 
• /?£ • / 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 1 
Constitution of Utah, Section 7 Article I 
Constitution of Utah, Section 11 Article I 
Utah Administrative Code, R562-18b-3.5 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(1) 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(2) 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(d) 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(g) 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2) 
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Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights re ta ined by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers rese rved to s ta tes o r people.l 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against s ta tes — Restriction of judicial 
power.l 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves, they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate,—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted,—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote, a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President —The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majonty of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority then from the two h ghest numbers on the 
list the Senate shall choose the Vice President a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of 
the whole number of Senators and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres 
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the 
United States 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1 [Slavery prohibited ] 
2 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1 [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion ] 
2 [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment 1 
3 [Disqualification to hold office ] 
4 [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid ] 
5 [Power to enforce amendment ] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abndged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
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P R E A M B L E 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1 [Inherent and inalienable rights J 
2 [All political power inherent in the people ] 
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union 1 
4 [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office J 
5 [Habeas corpus ) 
6 [Right to bear arms 1 
7 [Due process of law 1 
8 [Offenses bailable ] 
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments 1 
10 [Trial by jury 1 
11 [Courts open — Redress of injuries ] 
12 [Rights of accused persons ] 
13 [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury J 
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant ] 
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel ] 
16 I No imprisonment for debt — Exception } 
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting J 
18 | Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts [ 
19 I Treason defined — Proof ) 
20 |Military subordinate to the civil power ] 
21 [Slavery forbidden 1 
22 [Private property for public use ) 
23 [Irrevocable franchises forbidden J 
Section 
24 [Uniform operation of laws ] 
25 [Rights retained by people ] 
26 [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory I 
27 [Fundamental r igh ts ] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable r ights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties, to acquire, 
possess and protect property, to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences, to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances, to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people, and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government a*, the pub-
lic welfare may require 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office. 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof, no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public trust or for ar y vote at 
any election, nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof There shall be no union o" Church 
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions No public mone> or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Consi ltution 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus . ] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus >hall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to b e a r arms.] 
The individual ngh t of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed, but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms 1984 
Sec. 7. [Due p rocess of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bai lable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to supDort the 
charge, or 
443 
\u; persons cnargea witn a telony while on pro 
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime des 
ignated by statute as one for which bail may be 
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support 
the charge and the court finds by clear and con 
vincing evidence that the person would consti 
tute a substantial danger to any other person or 
to the community or is likely to flee the junsdic 
tion of the court if released on bail 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend 
ing appeal only as prescribed by law 1988 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines 
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by j u r y ] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded 1896 
Sec. 11. [Cour ts o p e n — Redress of injuries.l 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal m this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereofshall be as prescnbed by the Legislature 1947 
Sec 14. [Unreasonable sea rches fo rb idden — 
Issuance of w a r r a n t 1 
The right of the people to be secure in their per 
sons houses papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup 
ported by oath or affirmation particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized 1896 
Sec 15 [Freedom of speech a n d of the p ress — 
Libe l ] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal pros 
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jurv that the 
matter charged as libelous is true and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends the party 
shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact 1896 
Sec 16. [No impr i sonment for deb t — Excep-
tion ] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers vot ing ] 
All elections shall be free and no power civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage Soldiers in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex pos t facto l aws — Im-
pa i r ing contracts . ] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law lm 
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public u se ] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation 1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people 1896 
including Section 5(e) overpayments ana employer lia-
bilities Including interest and penalties which have not 
been collected within eight years after the issuance of a 
warrant will be written oft, unless payments are being 
received consistent with an Installment agreement or 
court order. All collection or offset action shall cease. 
The debt will be forgiven and forgotten as though no 
such debt ever existed and it will be removed from the 
Department records. When an overpayment for fraud 
established under Section 6(e) is removed from Depart-
ment record*, the claimant may receive waiting week 
credit and (Viture benefits may be paid without refer-
ence to the prior Section 6(e) overpayment 
KEY: unemployment compensation, ovvrptymeaU* 
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R562-18b. Approval of Counsel Fees. 
R562-18b-L General Definition. 
R562-18b-2. Procedure. 
R562-18b-3. Criteria for Evaluation of Fee Petition. 
R562-18b-4. Appeal Rights. 
R562-18b-l. General Definition. 
The intent of Section 35-4-18(b) is to protect the inter-
ests of the claimant who Is dependent on his benefits as 
a means of livelihood during his period of unemploy-
ment The Act does not address fees charged to employ-
era by their representatives as employers are deemed to 
be more knowledgeable in the marketplace and gener-
ally not in need of such safeguards. 
R£62-18b-l. Procedure. 
If a fee is to be charged a written petition for approval 
of fee must be submitted by the claimant's representa-
tive to the Administrative Law Judge before whom the 
representative appeared, or to the Chief Administrative 
Law Judge if no hearing was scheduled. An approval 
form can be obtained through the appeals office. The fee 
may be approved as requested or a lesser amount may 
be approved depending upon the appropriateness and 
justification of the request 
R662-18b-3 . Criteria for Evaluat ion of Fee 
Petit ion. 
The appropriateness of the fee will be determined 
baaed on the following criteria: 
1. Complexity of Issues Involved 
A case involving several complex issues would obvi-
ously require greater preparation. However, services 
performed which add nothing to the presentation of the 
case are to be avoided. For example: A simple case hav-
ing only one legal issue such as a voluntary quit would 
not normally require more than two hours of prepara-
tion time. The same is true for most work search issues. 
2. Time Actually Spent In: 
a. preparation of the case 
b. attending the hearing 
c. preparation of a brief (if required) 
A brief should be submitted only when requested or 
approved by the Administrative Law Judge. If a brief is 
submitted which is not requested or necessary, the 
approved fee may be reduced by the charges for time 
spent on the brief. 
3. Quality of Service Rendered 
a. preparedness of the representative 
b. organization and presentation of the case 
c. avoidance of undue delays 
Documents and witnesses should be made available 
at the time scheduled for the hearing and postpone-
ments should not be required except in unusual circum-
stances. Every effort should be msde to go forward with 
the hearing when it is originally scheduled especially in 
benefit cases as claimants sre frequently entirely with-
out income during the course of the appeal processes if 
benefits have been denied or if benefits have been 
allowed, excessive overpayments nay be created. In 
recognition of the due process right for payment when 
due, the Department of Labor has established a federal 
standard requiring that 60% of all appeals decisions be 
issued within 30 days of the date the appeal is filed. 
Therefore, unnecessary delays justify a reduction in the 
approved fee to the representative. 
d. necessity of representation 
If it is clearly demonstrated that the claimant was not 
in need of representation because of the simplicity of 
the case or the lack of preparation on the part of the 
representative only a minimal fee may be approved. 
4. Prevailing Fee 
The prevailing fee is the rate charged by others for the 
same type of service. In determining the prevailing fee 
for the service rendered, credence vrill be given to infor-
mation obtained from the Utah State Bar Association, 
Lawyer's Referral Service, or oth >r similar organiza-
tions as well aa determinations previously rendered by 
the Appeals Tribunal 
6. Limitation on Amount of the Fee 
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the 
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitle-
ment unless such a limitation would preclude the 
claimant from pursuing an appeal to the Supreme 
Court or would preclude in some other way an opportu-
nity for due process. 
R56218b-4. Appeal Rights. 
Should the representative disagree with the ruling of 
the Administrative Law Judge, a vrritten appeal may be 
made to the Board of Review witliin ten days from the 
date of Issuance of the decision. This appeal must set 
forth the grounds upon which the complaint Is made. 
KEY: un«mploym«f)t eomjxoMtlo*, counselors 
R56249a. Prosecution. 
R562-19a-l. General Definition. 
R562-19a-2. Guidelines for Referring Cases of Frsud to 
the Courte. 
R562-19a-l. General Definition 
The intent of this section of the Act is to assess penal* 
ties beyond those administered by the Department as 
provided by Section 35-4-5(e). AJI it would be impracti-
cal and beyond the intent of the law to prosecute all 
cases of fraud in the courts, it is left to the Department 
to determine which cases will be presented to the courM^ ^ ^ -
for addition*! civil penaltii*. A Pro*»ecution BoaW" "^ • «& 
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(a) For the week in which the claimant left 
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found 
by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in 
bona fide, covered employment and earned wages 
for those services equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant 
shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the 
claimant leaves work under circumstances of 
such a nature that it would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the 
employer, consider for the purposes of this chap-
ter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor mar-
ket in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity 
and good conscience. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily 
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to 
or in a new locality does so without good cause 
for purposes of this subsection. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act or 
omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the em-
ployer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission, and thereafter until the claim-
ant has earned an amount equal to at least 
six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount in bona fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was dis-
charged for dishonesty constituting a crime 
or any felony or class A misdemeanor in con-
nection with his work as shown by the facts, 
together with his admission, or as shown by 
his conviction in a court of competent juris-
diction of that crime and for the 51 next fol-
lowing weeks and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in 
bona fide covered employment and earned 
wages for those services equal to at least six 
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. 
If by reason of his alleged dishonesty or 
crime in connection with his work, the indi-
vidual is held in legal custody or is free on 
bail, any determination of his eligibility 
shall be held in abeyance pending his release 
or conviction. 
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant 
has failed without good cause to properly apply 
for available suitable work, to accept a referral to 
suitable work offered by the employment office, 
or to accept suitable work offered by an employer 
or the employment office. The ineligibility con-
tinues until the claimant has performed services 
in bona fide covered employment and earned 
wages for the services in an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibil-
ity for benefits for failure to apply, accept refer-
ral, or accept available suitable work under cir-
cumstances of such a nature that it would be con-
trary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall consider the purposes of 
this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's 
actions, and the extent to which the actions evi-
dence a genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is con-
trary to equity and good conscience. 
(1) In determining whether or not work is 
suitable for an individual, the commission 
shall consider the degree of risk involved to 
his health, safety, and morals, his physical 
fitness and prior training, his prior earnings 
and experience, his length of unemployment 
and prospects for securing local work in his 
customary occupation, the wages for similar 
work in the locality, and the distance of the 
available work from his residence. 
Prior earnings shall be considered on the 
basis of all four quarters used in establishing 
eligibility and not just the earnings from the 
most recent employer. The commission shall 
be more prone to find work as suitable the 
longer the claimant has been unemployed 
and the less likely the prospects are to secure 
local work in his customary occupation. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this chapter, no work is suitable, and ben-
efits shall not be denied under this chapter 
to any otherwise eligible individual for re-
fusing to accept new work under any of the 
following conditions: 
(i) if the position offered is vacant due 
directly to a strike, lockout, or other 
labor dispute; 
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other condi-
tions of the work offered are substan-
tially less favorable to the individual 
than those prevailing for similar work 
in the locality; or 
(iii) if as a condition of being em-
ployed the individual would be required 
to join a company union or to resign 
from or refrain from joining any bona 
fide labor organization, 
(d) For any week in which the commission 
finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage 
of work which exists because of a strike involving 
his grade, class, or group of workers at the fac-
tory or establishment at which he is or was last 
employed. 
(1) If the commission finds that a strike 
has been fomented by a worker of any em-
ployer, none of the workers of the grade, 
class, or group of workers of the individual 
who is found to be a party to the plan, or 
agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligi-
ble for benefits. However, if the commission 
finds that the strike is caused by the failure 
or refusal of any employer to conform to the 
provisions of any law of the state of Utah or 
of the United States pertaining to hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike 
shall not render the workers ineligible for 
benefits. 
(2) If the commission finds that the em-
ployer, his agent or representative has con-
spired, planned, or agreed with any of his 
workers, their agents or representatives to 
foment a strike, that strike shall not render 
the workers ineligible for benefits. 
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, sub-
sequent to his unemployment because of a 
strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has 
obtained employment and has been paid 
wages of not less than the amount specified 
in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as 
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1990 
63-46b-16. J u d i c i a l r ev iew — F o r m a l adjudica-
tive p roceed ings . 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal , and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic 
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
appliec the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the couil; 
(h) thg agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1988 
63-46b-17. Jud ic i a l rev iew — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re-
view of fonnal adjudicative proceedings by an ap^ 
pellate court, the court may award damages orf 
compensai,ion only to the extent expressly autho^ 
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law? 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discrei 
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; £a 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of' 
agenc> action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for 
further proceedings. -4e 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of 
final agency ad ion are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. 1987 
63-46b-18. Jud ic ia l rev iew — Stay a n d other 
t e m p o r a r y remedies p e n d i n g final dis-
posit ion. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may g r a i t a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy duiing the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 282 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Co u r t 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the gu_ 
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
 ex_ 
cept: 
(a) capitaf felony convictions or an appeal
 0 f 
an interlocutory order of a court of record inv0jv_ 
ing a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; ^ncj 
(e) those matters described in SubsectiQ n s 
(3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion
 m 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certior a r j 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, ^u^ 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certif ie(j 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the
 re_ 
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review
 0f 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 9^92 
78-2-3. Repealed.
 l 9 g 6 
78-2-4. S u p r e m e Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of prQ c e . 
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. ^ h e 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure ^ n ( j 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a v0 te 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah C o n . 
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may a u t h o ^ z e 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempor^ ^ 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore s^ au 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, ^ncj 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice \avf 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law.
 l 9 8 6 
78-2-5. Repealed.
 l 9 8 8 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall a p p ^ n t 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the ope ra^ o n 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. ^ e 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, ^nd 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed.
 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services t>f#7?y sheriff in thestete.
 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986, \988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — F u n c t i o n s 
— Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme C o u ^ 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creat ion — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal. jggg 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: T? 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex? 
cept the Public Service Commission, State Taic 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oik 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; >j$ 
(b) appeals from the district court review p£ 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of a g e n c i e s ^ 
political subdivisions of the state or other taj 
cai agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action und«l 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Board of Review erred in finding that the hearing before 
the Administrative Law Judge lasted approximately four (4) hours. 
The record clearly demonstrates that the total time in hearings was 
13 hours and that the total time between the Appellant's two 
attorney's was approximately 23 hours. 
The Board of Review awarded an unreasonably low attorney's 
fee. In this case, Appellant spent a combined total of 41.9 hours 
from the time they were retained by Mr. Karbakhsh to and including 
the decision of the Department of Employment Security. Mr. 
Karbakhsh agreed to retain counsel for the sum of Four Thousand 
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00). 
The claimant, Abraham Karbakhsh, was denied due process of law 
within the meaning of R562-18B-3.5. The Administrative Code allows 
for a waiver of the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on allowable 
attorney's fees. Due process considerations require a waiver of 
the 25 percent (25%) ceiling and further require an award of 
attorney's fees consistent with Appellant's claims. 
Under Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah and 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
the limitation applied by the Administrative Law Judge was an 
effective denial of a property without due process of law. The 
right to advice and assistance of retained counsel in civil 
litigation is implicit in the concept of due process. In an 
adversarial system of justice, representation by counsel is 
indispensable to effective protection of individual rights. 
4(a) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes cited herein are as follows and are 
set forth in their entirety in the Addendum of this brief. 
Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 1 
Constitution of Utah, Section 7 Article I 
Utah Administrative Code, R562-18b-3.5 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(1) 
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-5(b)(2) 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(d) 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4)(g) 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2) 
2(a) 
